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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
JONES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Paul Lamont Parham ("Parham") filed suit against his 
prison physician, Dr. Marshall Johnson ("Dr. Johnson"), 
claiming that Dr. Johnson was deliberately indifferent to 
his medical needs. The magistrate judge found that 
Parham's claim may have merit and ordered that counsel 
be appointed for Parham pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1915. 
This order was never adhered to. Two years later, Parham, 
still without counsel, petitioned the district court to appoint 
him an attorney. The district court acknowledged that 
Parham's claim had merit, but denied his request. Parham 
was then forced to try his claim pro se. The district court 
directed a verdict for Dr. Johnson because Parham failed to 
present an expert witness. Parham then filed a timely 
appeal and petitioned this court to appoint him counsel. 
This court granted his motion for counsel.1 
 
Upon review, we find that the magistrate judge's order 
should have been complied with and Parham should have 
had counsel below. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 
 
I. 
 
On November 15, 1989, Parham experienced a high- 
pitched ringing noise in his left ear. Parham expressed this 
concern to Dr. Johnson and told him that it may be an 
actual ringing noise in the prison, but he was unsure. Dr. 
Johnson diagnosed Parham's condition as tinnitus. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We take this opportunity to note that appellant's court-appointed 
counsel did an excellent job in this case, and we appreciate their time 
and effort. 
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Tinnitus is a "subjective noise sensation heard in one or 
both ears." Mosby's Medical Dictionary 1559 (Kenneth N. 
Anderson ed., 4th ed. 1993). This condition is generally not 
diagnosed without a comprehensive diagnosis, Linda M. 
Luxon, Tinnitus: Its Causes, Diagnosis, and Treatment, 306 
British Med. J. 1490 (1993); yet, Dr. Johnson diagnosed it 
after a simple exam. 
 
To treat the tinnitus, Dr. Johnson prescribed Cortisporin 
ear drops. Cortisporin is an antibiotic solution for the 
treatment of "superficial bacterial infections of the external 
auditory canal . . . ." Physicians' Desk Reference ("PDR") 
768 (43rd ed. 1989).2 The warnings in the PDR indicate 
that Cortisporin "should be used with care when the 
integrity of the tympanic membrane is in question because 
of the possibility of ototoxicity . . . [and because] [s]tinging 
and burning have been reported when this drug has gained 
access to the middle ear." Id. Moreover, the manual says 
nothing about using Cortisporin for tinnitus. Dr. Johnson 
never referred to the PDR. In fact, his testimony was in 
direct contrast to the warnings in the PDR; he testified that 
if the Cortisporin gets in the inner ear a patient probably 
would not experience burning and stinging, but may 
experience dizziness. 
 
Parham returned to Dr. Johnson several times after 
receiving this prescription and complained of burning and 
stinging sensations in his ear. Dr. Johnson, however, 
continued to prescribe Cortisporin. The PDR states that 
"[t]reatment should not be continued for longer than ten 
days." PDR at 768 (emphasis added).3 It further provides 
that if "sensitization or irritation occurs, medication should 
be discontinued promptly." Id. Dr. Johnson inexplicably 
continued the treatment for 114 days. 
 
On January 10, 1990, Parham returned to Dr. Johnson 
because his ear was now oozing with blood and his hearing 
was becoming impaired. The physician assistant noticed a 
laceration in Parham's tympanic membrane. Parham 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The PDR is currently in its 51st edition. We, however, refer to the 
43rd 
edition because it was the edition available to Dr. Johnson in 1989. 
 
3. Dr. Johnson testified that someone could stay on this medication for 
more than ten days if there were no adverse side effects. J.A. at 279-80. 
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requested that he be allowed to see an ear specialist, but 
Dr. Johnson declined this request and continued treating 
Parham with the same prescription. Even when Parham 
lost total hearing in his left ear in February, Dr. Johnson 
refused to recommend a specialist and continued along the 
same course. 
 
In January and February 1990, Parham saw Dr. Johnson 
at least five to six times. Each time Parham requested to be 
allowed to see an ear specialist, and each time Dr. Johnson 
declined his request. 
 
Finally, towards the end of February, Dr. Johnson 
allowed Parham to see an ear specialist. On March 6, 1990, 
an ear specialist examined Parham and confirmed that he 
had severe hearing loss in his left ear. The ear specialist 
recommended a battery of tests. 
 After these events, Parham decided to file suit against Dr. 
Johnson and various other defendants.4  Parham then filed 
five separate motions requesting that counsel be appointed. 
On January 6, 1992, the magistrate judge entered an order 
directing the clerk of court to appoint counsel for Parham. 
Two years later, the clerk still had not appointed counsel. 
 
Parham once again petitioned the district court to 
appoint counsel for him. The district court recognized that 
Parham's claim was "arguably meritorious in fact and law," 
but denied his request for counsel. District Court Order, 
June 27, 1994. The district court reasoned that since no 
expert testimony was involved Parham could competently 
try the case without the assistance of counsel. Id. 
 
Consequently, Parham tried the case pro se to a jury. At 
the end of the Parham's presentation of the evidence, the 
district court directed a verdict for Dr. Johnson. The 
district court stated that a reasonable juror could not find 
that Dr. Johnson was deliberately indifferent to Parham's 
medical problem. The district court reasoned that every 
time Parham sought attention from Dr. Johnson, Dr. 
Johnson listened to his complaint and responded to it. 
More importantly, the district court found that Parham did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The other defendants were eventually dismissed, and this appeal does 
not concern any of the defendants other than Dr. Johnson. 
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not present evidence of the causal connection between his 
pain and suffering and Dr. Johnson's actions. The district 
court held that in order to present sufficient evidence to 
withstand a directed verdict, Parham had to present the 
testimony of an expert witness to show "that your 
[Parham's] condition was caused by the treatment that Dr. 
Johnson gave to you or treatment which he failed to 
reasonably give to you; you haven't produced that kind of 
evidence." Finally, the district court found that Parham 
failed to present evidence that his condition was "serious." 
Ultimately, the district court held that Parham's failure to 
produce expert testimony led to the necessity of a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Parham claims that the district court 
improperly denied him counsel after first ordering the clerk 
of courts to appoint him counsel.5 The Supreme Court has 
not recognized nor has the court of appeals found a 
constitutional right to counsel for civil litigants. See, e.g., 
Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) 
("Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a 
constitutional right.") (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 
1990) (same); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 
F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is normally. . . no 
constitutional right to counsel in a civil case."). 
Additionally, civil litigants do not even have a statutory 
right to appointed counsel. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
153 (3d Cir. 1993). Despite the lack of a constitutional right 
to counsel, section 1915(e)(1) provides that "[t]he court may 
request an attorney to represent any person unable to 
employ counsel." Such appointment is discretionary, and 
thus, we review the district court's decision to deny counsel 
for an abuse of discretion. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 158. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Parham also argues that the district court erred in granting the 
Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Defendant's counsel 
agreed at oral argument that this case must be remanded if we find that 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied Parham counsel. 
Because we find that the district court erred in not appointing Parham 
counsel, we need not reach the directed verdict issue. 
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A. 
 
While all of the circuits agree that appointment of 
counsel is discretionary, not all of the circuits agree when 
counsel should be appointed. Several circuits have held 
that counsel can be appointed only in "exceptional 
circumstances," but the Second, Third, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits have chosen not to read such a requirement 
into the statute. Compare United States v. $292,888.04 in 
United States Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) 
("Under section 1915(d), counsel may be designated only in 
`exceptional circumstances.' ") (citation omitted); Lavado, 
992 F.2d at 605-6 (holding that appointment of counsel is 
a privilege justified only by exceptional circumstances)6; 
Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1096 (same); Cookish v. Cunningham, 
787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[A]n indigent litigant must 
demonstrate exceptional circumstances in his or her case 
to justify the appointment of counsel."); with Tabron, 6 F.3d 
at 155 (rejecting "exceptional circumstances" test); Rayes v. 
Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The 
appointment of counsel should be given serious 
consideration . . . if the [indigent] plaintiff has not alleged 
a frivolous or malicious claim and the pleadings state a 
prima facie case.") (internal quotation and citations 
omitted); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 
1986) (rejecting the "exceptional circumstances" rationale 
and adopting factors enunciated in Maclin v. Freake, infra); 
Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam) (delineating factors courts should consider in 
appointing counsel including merits of claim, chance of 
success, complexity of factual evidence and legal issues, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. I recognize that I previously authored Lavado in the Sixth Circuit, 
which endorsed the "exceptional circumstances" test. However, after a 
thorough review of the rationale behind Judge Becker's decision in 
Tabron and the cases he followed, I have re-evaluated my position. I now 
agree that Congress did not intend nor did they state that appointment 
of counsel is only justified in "exceptional circumstances"; rather, this 
standard is one of judicial creation. In recanting my previous view, I 
invoke the statement of Justice Felix Frankfurter, "Wisdom too often 
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes 
late." Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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whether conflicting testimony will be presented, and 
capability of litigant to represent himself ). In fact, this 
circuit has found "[n]othing in [the] clear language [of 
section 1915(e)(1)] suggests that an appointment is 
permissible only in some limited set of circumstances. Nor 
have we found any indication in the legislative history of 
the provision to support such a limitation." Tabron, 6 F.3d 
at 157. 
 
Consequently, the Tabron court delineated various factors 
to aid district courts in determining when it is proper to 
appoint counsel for an indigent litigant in a civil case. As a 
preliminary matter, the plaintiff's claim must have some 
merit in fact and law. Id.; see also Maclin, 650 F.2d at 887 
("First, the district court should consider the merits of the 
indigent litigant's claim."). 
 
If the district court determines that the plaintiff 's claim 
has some merit, then the district court should consider the 
following factors: 
 
       (1) the plaintiff's ability to present his or her own 
       case; 
 
       (2) the complexity of the legal issues; 
 
       (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be 
       necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue 
       such investigation; 
 
       (4) the amount a case is likely to turn on credibility 
       determinations; 
 
       (5) whether the case will require the testimony of 
       expert witnesses; 
 
       (6) whether the plaintiff can attain and afford counsel 
       on his own behalf. 
 
Id. at 155-56, 157 n.5. This list of factors is not exhaustive, 
but instead should serve as a guidepost for the district 
courts. Correspondingly, courts should exercise care in 
appointing counsel because volunteer lawyer time is a 
precious commodity and should not be wasted on frivolous 
cases. Id. at 157. 
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B. 
 
In this case, the magistrate judge originally granted 
Parham's motion for appointment of counsel and ordered 
that the clerk of courts appoint counsel for Parham. J.A. at 
97. After two years, however, nothing occurred. When 
Parham once again petitioned the district court to appoint 
him counsel, it denied his request. The district court 
conceded that Parham's case "is arguably meritorious in 
fact and law," J.A. at 191 (District Court's Order Denying 
Counsel June 27, 1994), but concluded that Parham was 
capable of representing himself, the legal issues were not 
difficult, the facts were manageable, and there was no 
indication that expert testimony would be presented. Id. at 
191-92. The district court provided no rationale for its 
conclusions. 
 
This court must determine whether the district court's 
decision to deny Parham's motion for appointment of 
counsel was an abuse of discretion. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 158. 
We agree with the district court that this case is"arguably 
meritorious." First, Dr. Johnson diagnosed tinnitus without 
a comprehensive diagnosis, even though a comprehensive 
diagnosis is recommended. See Luxon, 306 British Med. J. 
at 1490 ("Diagnosing the cause of tinnitus requires a 
detailed history and examination."). Second, Dr. Johnson 
prescribed Cortisporin ear drops. The PDR, however, says 
nothing about prescribing Cortisporin for tinnitus, see PDR 
at 768; yet Dr. Johnson never referred to the PDR. 
 
After using the Cortisporin, Parham complained of 
burning and stinging sensations in his ear, but Dr. 
Johnson said that Cortisporin would not cause such 
sensations. The PDR says otherwise--"If sensitization or 
irritation occurs, medication should be discontinued 
promptly." Id. Parham returned to Dr. Johnson various 
times complaining of burning and stinging sensations, but 
Dr. Johnson nevertheless continued to prescribe 
Cortisporin. In fact, he prescribed it for an astronomical 
time period--114 days--even though the PDR warned 
against it being used for more than ten days. At one point, 
Parham came to Dr. Johnson with his ear oozing with blood 
and requested to see a specialist. Dr. Johnson rejected his 
request. He sent Parham back to his cell with the same 
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prescription. Even when Parham lost total hearing in his 
ear, Dr. Johnson refused to allow him to see a specialist. 
Finally, after multiple visits, Dr. Johnson allowed Parham 
to see a specialist, who found that Parham suffered a 
severe hearing loss. We think these allegations, coupled 
with the evidence Parham has already established, present 
a meritorious case. Of course, at trial Parham will still have 
to show that Dr. Johnson's "[a]cts or omissions [were] 
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976). We will leave that determination in the hands of the 
jury.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We recognize the well-established law in this and virtually every 
circuit 
that actions characterizable as medical malpractice do not rise to the 
level of "deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail 
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979). In Pierce, we said that 
"[a]lthough 
negligence in the administration of medical treatment to prisoners is not 
itself actionable under the Constitution, failure to provide adequate 
treatment is a violation of the Eighth Amendment when it results from 
`deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury.' " 612 
F.2d at 762 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105)). 
 
We find that the facts here are sufficient that a jury could reasonably 
find that the care received by Parham while incarcerated rose to the level 
of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, and appointment of 
counsel was therefore appropriate. In clarifying the appropriate 
standard, we previously stated in Pierce: 
 
       [T]his test affords considerable latitude to prison medical 
authorities 
       in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate 
       patients. Courts will "disavow any attempt to second-guess the 
       propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . 
[which] 
       remains a question of sound professional judgment." Bowring v. 
       Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Implicit in this 
deference 
       to prison medical authorities is the assumption that such informed 
       judgment has, in fact, been made. When, however, prison authorities 
       prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for 
       serious medical needs or deny access to a physician capable of 
       evaluating the need for such treatment, the constitutional standard 
       of Estelle has been violated. 
 
Id. at 762 (emphasis added). Similarly, in White v. Napoleon, we held 
that "treat[ment] . . . with an inappropriate drug for no valid reason . . 
. 
is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious 
medical 
needs." 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Finding that Parham has presented a meritorious case 
does not conclude our inquiry. We still must perform the 
requisite six-factor Tabron analysis. 
 
(1) The plaintiff's ability to present his or her own 
       case. 
 
In considering this factor, courts should consider"the 
plaintiff's education, literacy, prior work experience, and 
prior litigation experience." Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. 
Furthermore, courts must consider whether the plaintiff 
has access to necessary resources like a typewriter, 
photocopier, telephone, and computer. Id. (citing Rayes, 
969 F.2d at 703-04). While these factors will not always be 
determinative, they should be considered in each 
meritorious case. 
 
The Defendant argues that Parham's ability to present 
and respond to motions indicates he was fully capable of 
presenting his own case. Parham's ability to file and 
respond to motions does indicate that Parham had some 
legal knowledge and is literate; however, this fact alone 
does not conclusively establish that Parham was able to 
present his own case. In Tabron, the indigent prisoner filed 
interrogatories and responded to motions, but the court 
found this inconclusive. See id. at 152. Instead, the Tabron 
court found that the prisoners lack of legal experience and 
the complex discovery rules clearly put him at a 
disadvantage in countering the defendant's discovery 
tactics. Id. at 158. 
 
In the case at bar, Parham did not appear to have the 
ability to present an effective case. This seems especially 
true considering the fact that Parham could not present a 
prima facie case below, even though he withstood summary 
judgment. Furthermore, just a cursory glance at the PDR 
indicates that if Parham was assisted by counsel his case 
probably would have reached the jury. This case, like 
Tabron, involved complex discovery rules that Parham was 
obviously not able to comprehend. See infra, section 2. 
These rules prevented Parham from presenting an effective 
case below. 
 
(2) The complexity of the legal issues. 
 
Where the legal issues are complex, it will probably serve 
everyone involved if counsel is appointed. See Tabron, 6 
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F.3d at 156; Maclin, 650 F.2d at 889 ("[W]here the law is 
not clear, it will often best serve the ends of justice to have 
both sides of a difficult legal issue presented by those 
trained in legal analysis."). In this case, the ultimate issue 
appears relatively simple--whether Dr. Johnson was 
deliberately indifferent to Parham's serious medical needs. 
A lay person, like Parham, should be able to comprehend 
what he has to prove when the legal issue is 
understandable. 
 
However, comprehension alone does not equal ability to 
translate that understanding into presentation. While the 
ultimate issue may be comprehensible, courts must still 
look to the proof going towards the ultimate issue and the 
discovery issues involved. In this case, Parham was not 
able to do a simple authentication of the Cortisporin bottle, 
was not able to take depositions, and was not represented 
at his own deposition. Parham's inability to introduce the 
Cortisporin bottle exemplifies the fact that counsel was 
needed in this case. 
 
During trial, Parham attempted to introduce into 
evidence the Cortisporin bottle. When he did so, the 
Defendant objected and claimed that the label on the bottle 
was inadmissible hearsay. The district court sustained the 
objection and stated the following: 
 
       That is hearsay. It's inadmissible hearsay. Not only 
       that, documents such as that have to be authenticated. 
       . . . somebody . . . must testify that the document, 
       which is being offered, is, in fact, what it purports to 
       be. 
 
J.A. at 237-238. Parham could not even begin a simple 
authentication procedure; this authentication procedure 
was especially simple since Parham ostensibly could have 
authenticated the bottle as the one Dr. Johnson prescribed 
to him. Second, the label probably was not hearsay. Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as a "a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." Parham could have argued that he did 
not offer the warning label on the bottle for the "truth of the 
matter asserted," but instead to show that Dr. Johnson had 
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notice of the warning label. Consequently, the warning label 
would not be hearsay. 5 Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence S 801.03(1), at 801-11 (2d ed. 1997) ("If 
. . . Declarant's statement is not offered for its truth, the 
inability to assess Declarant's credibility is immaterial, and 
the statement is not hearsay.") (internal footnote omitted). 
Ultimately, these factors weigh in favor of appointment of 
counsel. 
 
(3) The degree to which factual investigation will be 
    necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to 
    pursue such investigation. 
 
The Tabron court noted that courts should consider a 
prisoner's predicament in attempting to obtain facts, i.e. 
the confines of prison. 6 F.3d at 156; see also Rayes, 969 
F.2d at 704 (noting the difficulties prisoner plaintiffs with 
meritorious cases may have with discovery). Further, courts 
should be aware that it may be difficult for indigent 
plaintiffs to understand the complex discovery rules. 
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. A medical malpractice case involves 
complex facts and medical records that even most lawyers 
struggle to comprehend. Hence, most of these cases require 
expert testimony. 
 
In this case, the district court ultimately granted the 
Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law 
because Parham did not have an expert witness. J.A. at 
315. A lawyer conducting discovery would probably have 
recognized that it was necessary to obtain expert testimony. 
We recognize that it still may be difficult for appointed 
counsel to obtain and afford an expert; yet, we believe that 
appointed counsel will have a much better opportunity to 
obtain an expert than would an indigent prisoner. 
Consequently, this factor tips towards appointing counsel. 
 
(4) The amount a case is likely to turn on credibility 
    determinations. 
 
The district court's decision in this case did not appear to 
rely upon credibility determinations. While the case 
ultimately may have relied upon credibility, it is difficult to 
imagine a case that does not. Thus, when considering this 
factor, courts should determine whether the case was solely 
a swearing contest. In this instance, it does not appear to 
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be a swearing contest. Thus, this factor alone does not 
encourage the appointment of counsel. 
 
(5) Whether the case will require the testimony of 
    expert witnesses. 
 
After the district court's judgment as a matter of law, 
there is no doubt that Parham needed an expert witness. 
When the district court was issuing its judgment as a 
matter of law, it stated "you haven't produced any expert 
medial opinion, which [in] . . . this case you must." J.A. at 
315 (emphasis added) (citing Boring v. Kazkiewicz, 833 
F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that expert testimony 
is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would 
not be apparent to a lay person)). Thus, according to the 
district court, Parham had to produce an expert witness. 
 
This finding by the district court is especially startling 
because when the district court denied Parham's motion for 
court-appointed counsel, the district court stated that it did 
not seem likely that expert testimony would be needed in 
this case. Yet, in dismissing the case, the same district 
judge cited as a deficiency in Parham's case the lack of 
expert testimony, which the district judge now deemed 
essential. It is troublesome that the court could use the 
lack of expert testimony as a shield to protect its denial of 
the motion for counsel and then as a sword to slay the 
indigent plaintiff's case. 
 
Consequently, this factor weighs heavily in favor of 
appointment of counsel. 
 
(6) Whether the plaintiff can attain and afford 
    counsel on his own behalf. 
 
There is no evidence that Parham could have afforded 
counsel. Furthermore, it appears that he made every effort 
possible, including six motions, to obtain counsel, but it 
was to no avail. This factor also weighs heavily in favor of 
appointment of counsel. 
 
III. 
 
The district court abused its discretion by not appointing 
counsel. This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
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magistrate judge ordered that counsel be appointed. 
Courts, of course, should be aware of the scarcity of 
counsel willing to accept pro bono appointments. However, 
where a plaintiff's case appears to have merit and most of 
the aforementioned factors have been met, courts should 
make every attempt to obtain counsel. See, e.g., Mallard v. 
United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) ("[I]n 
a time when the need for legal services among the poor is 
growing and public funding for such services has not kept 
pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time and 
skills pro bono publico is manifest."); Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157 
("Representation of indigent litigants is not only an 
important responsibility of members of the bar, but it also 
provides an excellent opportunity for newer attorneys to 
gain courtroom experience."). The Tabron factors will ensure 
that courts do not appoint counsel to frivolous cases. 
 
No evidence exists that the court made an attempt to 
obtain counsel in this case, even after it granted the 
plaintiff 's motion for appointment of counsel. The decision 
of the district court was not consistent with the sound 
exercise of discretion.8 
 
Thus, we REVERSE and REMAND this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Parham also argues that the court below abused its discretion by not 
providing him guidance as to how to try his case, how to deal with 
motions, not explaining the "legal jargon," and etc. We, however, are 
hesitant to direct a district court how to act at every stage of the 
proceedings. In this case, the district court could have provided more 
guidance than it did, but its choice not to provide as much guidance as 
possible was not an abuse of discretion.                                 
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